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The paper builds on the Goodwin (1967) model which describes the distributive cycle of capitalist economies whereby mass
unemployment is generated periodically through the conflict about income distribution between capital and labor. We add to
this model a segmented labor market structure with fluid, latent, and stagnant components. The model exhibits a unique balanced
growth path which depends on the speeds with which workers are pushed into or out of the labor market segments. We investigate
the stability properties of this growth path with segmented labormarkets and find that, though there is a stabilizing inflation barrier
term in the wage Phillips curve, the interaction with the latent and stagnant portions of the labor market generates potentially
(slowly) destabilizing forces if policy measures are absent that regulate these labor markets. We then introduce an activating labor
market policy, where government in addition acts as employer of last resort thereby eliminating the stagnant portion of the labor
market, whilst erecting benefit systems that partially sustain the incomes of workers that have to leave the floating/latent labor
market of the private sector of the economy. We show that such policies guarantee the macrostability of the economy’s balanced
growth path.
1. Introduction
1.1. The Theory of Segmented Labor Markets and the Case of
Germany as a Contemporaneous Example. In this paper we
reconsider the trichotomy of floating, latent, and stagnant
segments of the labor market in the framework of the
Goodwin [1] model of the distributive cycle and discuss
this concept of segmented labor markets both from the
theoretical and the empirical perspectives. The significance
and relevance of this trichotomy can be easily observed with
regard to the situation of labor markets in both advanced
and developing countries. Marx introduced this theory of
specifically segmented labor markets in conjunction with his
discussion of the general law of capitalist accumulation in
Capital, Volume I. Reconsidering the Marxian trichotomy
of floating (fluid), latent, and stagnant segments of the
labor market, where the last segment—the stagnant one—
can also be described as a dead segment, we can easily
discover similarities on the level of well-being (not in absolute
income of course) to the situation of the employees in
the German economy of the 21st century. We have normal
occupations, the floating segment, atypical employment in
the low income sector (part-time workers, temporary work
organized by special leasing firms and low paid), so-called
minijobs, in the latent segment, and unemployed persons
receiving unemployment benefits (for one year, elderly people
for 18–24 months), and long-term unemployed persons, with
only marginal chances of a return to proper work, in the dead
segment of the labor market.
Germany had a regulation for unemployed persons until
2005 which consisted of two forms of unemployment sup-
port, a maximum of two years of unemployment benefits,
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and thereafter “Sozialhilfe” (social help) with a smaller sum
of money. In general, the length of payment and some other
decisions were dependent on the length of working time
before becoming unemployed and thus on the amount of
payment into the unemployment insurance which was—
and is—obligatory in Germany (see Blien et al. [2] for an
overviewof the situation of unemployed persons andGerman
regulations before the so-called “Hartz reforms”).
In 2005, a radical labormarket “reform” took place against
which protests have never stopped. It is named “Hartz IV”
because one of the main persons involved in the creation
was Peter Hartz, a former German CEO, among others at the
Volkswagen enterprise. A reason for the new regulation was
the high increase of unemployed persons at the end of the
20th and beginning of the 21st centuries so that a commission
was founded, the Hartz Commission, which intended to
reduce the number of more than four million unemployed
persons to less than half of it within four years, which
however never happened. The new regulations have reduced
the payment of unemployment benefits to one year and put
together “Sozialhilfe” (social help) and a new unemployment
benefit system II, better known in Germany under the name
Hartz IV. The number IV can be explained by the following
development from 2002 on (see Tompson [3], 229ff.):
(i) Hartz I (implemented in 2003) made reforms of the
restrictive legislation on temporary work and work
leasing, both of which were eased. Stricter rules with
regard to registering as unemployed and accepting
offered work were made;
(ii) Hartz II (also implemented in 2003) has renewed the
possibilities of founding a one-person business (Ich-
AG) and made a reform of the minijobs (income up
to 400 Euro) which do only demand (small) social
securities payment from the employer, but not from
the employee;
(iii) Hartz III (implemented in 2004) includes a reorgan-
isation of the employment agency and special rules
of cutting benefits if an offered work is not accepted
without understandable reasons;
(iv) Hartz IV (implemented in 2005) has merged Sozial-
hilfe (social help) and unemployment benefit with
unemployment benefit II which is at present fixed on
364 Euro per month (plus payment of rents, etc.). For
children there exist further standard rates.
While the—in 2004 renewed—Federal Institute for Employ-
ment has to deal with unemployed persons and try to find
jobs for them and to organize the Hartz IV-payment, the
underlying laws are to be found in theGerman Social Security
Codes II and III which regulate the work of the Federal
Institute for Employment. Both codes have been updated in
recent years.While the main topics in Social Security Code II
deal with basic social care as well as employment promotion,
the dominant aspects in Social Security Code III refer to job-
creating measures and job training. Hartz IV recipients are
mainly part of Security Code II, while unemployed persons
who receive unemployment benefits for one year (about 60%
of their former income) are dealt with in Security Code
III though some tasks are mixed. Persons who earn only
little in a job can receive an additional support within the
Hartz IV regulations. A basic principle in both codes is the
orientation towards workfare in contrast to welfare, which
means that unemployed persons are supposed to engage
themselves in skill enhancement and intensive job finding
(Federal Statistical Office [4]).
In 2009, there were 43 million persons in the active part
of theGerman labor force, but nearly fivemillion persons had
only a so-called minijob (Eurofound [5]). Since the 1990s the
number of low wage jobs has significantly increased by up to
20% of all employees. (See Bosch and Kalina ([6], 19ff.) for
the development in the last twenty years.) Additionally, the
German government refused a general minimum wage for
years. But this has changed since the federal elections in late
2013. The introduction of a minimum wage is currently on
the way. Solow ([7], 12ff.) discusses several possible reasons
for the German downward development in labor market
regulations, among which the growth of the service sector
(in contrast to the manufacturing sector), gradual weakening
of union power, intensified competition through incoming
workers, for example, from Eastern Europe, and relics of
the Bismarckian organisation of the German welfare state
(especially the “male breadwinner household”) are under-
lined as possible negative influences. He—as well as Bosch
andWeinkopf [8] and Bosch and Kalina [6]—argues that the
introduction of minimum wages might be a first step away
from this downward development.
In 2010, there were 3 244 000 unemployed persons, fol-
lowing the information of the Federal Institute for Employ-
ment, which is a significant fall compared to 2009. Altogether,
around 6 million employable persons received in 2010 bene-
fits due to the Social Security Codes II and III, which means
a reduction of 2% with regard to the preceding year, mainly
with regard to those who received unemployment benefits.
There were on the other hand one and a half million persons
involved in ameasure of labormarket policy,mainly a formof
skill training, which was nearly 15% less than in 2009, which
means reduced support in finding a new job.
The data of unemployed persons shows that more than
20% of the Hartz IV receivers are long-term unemployed
meaning for more than 24 months (Bundesagentur fu¨r
Arbeit, 2010), but many Hartz IV receivers are in this system
for more than five years and more than 10 years even. This
problem is related to the question of sufficient qualifications
which are often missing. Therefore, the so-called Hartz IV
people are often linked to the so-called problem groups,
which includemigrantswithout any professional or even edu-
cational qualifications, single parent households, unskilled
persons in general, and early school leavers.
While the data from the Federal Statistical Office seem
to suggest not only lots of different supports for unemployed
persons, but also a decreasing number of unemployed per-
sons (of both types), the situation of these parts of the society
is far from being satisfactory (Bundesagentur fu¨r Arbeit [9]).
The situation of Hartz IV receivers is not only close to
poverty, a fact which is especially difficult for children and
juveniles, but it also containsmany degrading situations since
persons who apply for Hartz IV not only have to reveal the
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details of their financial situation (savings, properties, etc.)
and their living conditions (family, friends, etc.), but also
are forced to change their living place when they have too
many rooms or pay a high rent (which will be overtaken
by the agency). Furthermore they have to apply for all extra
expenses, including clothing, birthday presents, and traveling
to a sick relative.
Another degrading aspect is the often low support in
finding a new job or even getting new qualifications which
gives a feeling of being no longer part of the workforce. Fur-
thermore, the public opinion on idleworkforcememberswho
are viewed as refusing work can be, and is, also degrading. It
has also to be taken into consideration that many long-term
unemployed persons who live from Hartz IV will get into a
difficult situation when they are old because their retirement
pension can be very low so that they will depend on the paid
basic social help for aged persons.
Therefore, it is correct to compare Hartz IV with the
stagnant (dead) segment of Marx’s classification as described
above. Of course, their situation is not comparable to the
situation of the dead segment on the labor market at his
times, but in a cross-sectional comparison they are never-
theless in a comparable position concerning life perspectives,
neighborhood problems, tendencies to drug consumption,
and inclination towards violence.
Moreover, there are certainly many difficult atypical
working conditions in Germany that can be related to the
Marxian latent segment though these workers have a chance
to move up into the floating segment like skilled and well-
trained unemployed persons who may find a new job after
some months. On the other hand, there are many persons
in this segment who can also easily drop into the stagnant
segment when, for example, part-time occupied workers lose
their job, or temporary work organized by special leasing
firms is so low paid that the comparison with regular workers
is discriminating. These types of workers are indeed also
supported through the Hartz IV program to a significant
degree (around 3/4 of the Hartz IV receivers).
Unemployment is, of course, the root of all these
problems. In this paper we will therefore—among other
questions—also deal with proposed solutions to solve this
problem such as basic income guarantee (BIG) (the Hartz
IV contributions of the state currently amount to roughly
500 Euro per head) or an employer of last resort (ELR).
The importance of such programs cannot be underestimated,
since the increase in child poverty that is accompanying
mass unemployment is indeed of the type of a ticking time
bomb (in Germany social help supplied to children increased
from 130000 children in 1965 to 1.7 million children in
2010). To have approximately 10% of workers in the new
classification system “Hartz IV families” who are by and large
chronically unemployed with no hope for improvement of
their lot represents a situation in a democracy that can only
be considered as fatal. This paper will provide against such
a background a model of Marx’s segmented labor market
analysis and a reform proposal that tries to cure such a
situation.
1.2. Modeling Strategy. Goodwin’s [1] Marxian growth cycle
model is one of the truly baseline models of macroeconomic
theory, comparable to the orthodox Solow [10] model in its
simplicity, but totally different in its implications from the
latter type of growth theory. (See Flaschel [11] for a detailed
study of this type of approach.) This has indeed also been
acknowledged by Solow himself (see Solow [12]) and has led
to numerous publications onmodifications and extensions of
this approach to a distributive cycle.
Barbosa-Filho and Taylor [13] have characterized this
cycle mechanism; see also Taylor ([14], ch. 9) in this regard.
Recently, in 2006, there has been a special issue in the Journal
Structural Change and Economic Dynamics [15] onGoodwin’s
legacy and its continuation as well as an edited volume on
this subject; see Flaschel and Landesmann [16]. There has
also been recent empirical work on this distributive cycle
by Harvie [17], Veneziani and Mohun [18, 19], Franke et al.
[20], Fiorio et al. [21], and others. This indicates that the
model of the reserve army mechanism designed by Goodwin
[1, 22] on the basis of Marx’s analysis of this mechanism is
still attracting numerous studies of its further development
and its empirical evaluation.
The paper shows that Goodwin’s model, which is charac-
terized by the unrestricted operation of the “law of capitalist
accumulation,” can be reformulated in such a way as to
produce socioeconomic outcomes that are socially and polit-
ically acceptable. We should however mention that, in our
formulation of reformed capitalism, the role of changes in the
composition of capital remains to be explored. In his detailed
exposition of the operation of capitalist accumulation, Marx
places great emphasis on the rise in the organic composition
of capital as a principal force behind the increase in structural
unemployment. We do not pursue this matter in this paper.
Our main focus is to integrate the three segments of the
labormarket under the assumption of a given capital intensity
(constant labor productivity) and to show, on this basis, that
active labor market policy can generate an outcome that
eliminates the stagnant portion of unemployment.
From this perspective, this paper reconsiders the growth
cycle of Goodwin [1] to incorporate the various forms of
unemployment pointed out byMarx [23]: the floating, latent,
and stagnant segments of the labor market. In Goodwin’s
model, only the floating type of unemployment was con-
sidered. We reformulate Goodwin’s model by postulating an
interaction between the three labor market segments. We
then investigate its steady state positions and their stability in
this extended framework.We then show that, in the presence
of a benefit system that is undertaken by government as
“employer of last resort,” the stagnant segment of the labor
market can be assumed as eliminated, which improves the
stability of the economy. (To our knowledge, the first study
of an unemployment benefit system in the context of the
Goodwin growth cycle model was provided by Glombowski
and Kru¨ger [24].) The paper thus shows that Goodwin’s
model, which is in a way characterized by the unrestricted
operation of the “law of capitalist accumulation,” can be
reformulated in such a way as to produce socioeconomic
outcomes that are socially and politically acceptable.
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The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2
adds to the Goodwin model a segmented labor market struc-
ture, in which the different types of unemployment interact
on the basis of rates of employment and unemployment.
Section 3 provides a steady state analysis of the model and
shows that the steady state rates of employment in the latent
and stagnant segments depend on the speeds with which
workers are pushed into or out of these segments. It also
investigates the stability properties of the extended model,
both from the theoretical and the numerical perspective.
We find that adding the latent and stagnant portions of the
labor market in this model generates potentially destabilizing
forces, though there is a stabilizing inflation barrier term in
our Phillips curve formulation. Section 4 introduces an active
labor market policy where government acts as employer of
last resort, thereby eliminating the stagnant portion of the
labor market, whilst erecting a benefit system that sustains
the incomes of workers that leave the floating labor market
into the latent one. We show that this policy guarantees
the macrostability of the economy’s growth path. Section 5
briefly considers the historical origins of social legislation in
Germany and presents possible future policies that intend to
replace the Hartz IV system in a stepwise fashion by civic
work. Section 6 concludes.
2. The Model: Segmented Labor and
the Distributive Cycle
The model of the distributive cycle of Flaschel and Greiner
[25] can serve as a major reference point to the approach put
forth in this paper. Their model describes by its construction
a viable situation for a capitalist economy. In that model,
it is shown that the introduction of a benefit system and
minimum and maximum real wage rules obtained through a
social pact between labor and capital significantly improves
the economic performance of Goodwin’s [1] reserve army
economy. However, there is one serious neglect in such a
scenario. Mass unemployment occurs without any social
consequences for the household structure of the working
class. In Marx’s description of the reserve army mechanism
this is taken note of and it is even claimed there that the
distributive cycle necessarily implies a hierarchy of three
segments in the labor market, the fluid (note that the terms
fluid and floating will be used synonymously throughout
the paper), the latent, and the stagnant one (the terms
stagnant and dead are interchangeable with respect to the
lowest segment of the labor market). The existence of such
hierarchy is unavoidable under an unrestricted evolution of
the capitalist mode of production. In this paper, as distinct
from Flaschel and Greiner [25], we provide a model in
which these labor market and unemployment hierarchies are
present and interacting.
Before starting the discussion of the model let us briefly
state that Goodwin-type models are pure supply side models
where Says’s law holds since all wages are consumed and all
profits are invested. (This fact might be no serious restriction
for the policy conclusions we will derive from the model.
Though demand issues are for sure of importance as well,
any arguments made in favor of the wage side would only
be strengthened by the incorporation of aggregate demand
aspects. Thus, we consider to use a supply side approach
to be ideally adequate to challenge orthodox supply-side
oriented models’ policy implications.) The Goodwin-type
models also assume free hiring and firing, since no delays
concerning employment adjustment processes are normally
present in them. We moreover exclude government activities
from consideration and are thus assuming with respect to the
unemployed or even those members of the workforce in the
stagnant (“dead”) segment of the labor market that they are
supported by other family members, by the church, by casual
work, and from beggary. All these flows between worker
households are not modeled explicitly, but only represented
through the total wage payment to workers of type 1 or 2. For
interpretational simplicity we consider workers of type 1 as
living in the town centers, type 2 as living in the outskirts of
town, and the ones of the dead segment as living in the slums.
We consider the Marxian growth cycle model as it was
formulated by Goodwin [1], without any consideration of
social security yet, but add a consideration of the evolution
of latent and stagnant portions of the labor markets. The
growth cycle dynamics for the floating labor market can then
be formulated (if the other segments of the labor market are
still ignored):
?̂? = 𝛽
𝑤
(
𝑦/𝑧
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where 𝑧 is a constant output-labor ratio, 𝑦 a constant output
capital ratio, 𝜔 the real wage, 𝛽
𝑤
the adjustment speed of
the real wage in reaction to the state of the labor market,
𝑒 the steady state employment rate, 𝐿𝑠 the labor supply, 𝑛
the growth rate of the labor force, 𝑤 the nominal wage, and
𝑝 the price level. Equation (1) says that real wage growth
is a function of the deviation of the employment rate from
its steady state rate. Equation (2) is an accounting identity
describing the growth rate of the labour-capital ratio. Adding
the other two segments of the labor market we assume now
for the floating part of it (indexed by 1) law ofmotion for their
real wage:
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The real wage Phillips curve in the first labor market remains
based on demand pressure term in the first labor market
((𝑦/𝑧
1
)/𝑙
𝑠
1
) − 𝑒
1
and is now augmented by the positive
influence of the second labor market through an increasing
rate of employment 𝑒
2
= ((𝑦/𝑧
2
)/𝑙
𝑠
2
), 𝑙
𝑠
2
= 𝐿
𝑠
2
/𝐾 in the
atypical (second) labor market and by a negative influence
from the third (stagnant) segment of the labor market where
there is no employment at all. The extent of this stagnant
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segment is measured by 𝐷/𝐿𝑠 = 𝑑/𝑙𝑠 and is related to what
Marx’s considers as pauperism in chapter 25, Section 4. The
last term is an error-correction term for the real wage and
can be viewed as a way to capture the influence of the rate
of profit on the steady state real wage. The law of motion for
labor intensity is the same as before but now refers to the
whole of labor supply per unit of capital. This is driven by
the rate of profit, where the given real wage per unit of capital
has now to be deducted. We assume in this paper that the
real wage in the latent segment of the labor market is a given
subsistence wage, while there are no wages paid at all in the
sphere of pauperism.Note that the givenmagnitudes 𝑧
1
, 𝑧
2
of
output per unit of employed labor have now to be interpreted
in inverted form as employment coefficients since they are
used here to calculate employment on the two active labor
markets on the basis of a given output-capital ratio 𝑦.
Note also that we have, by definition, the identity 𝐿𝑠 =
𝐿
𝑠
1
+𝐿
𝑠
2
+𝐷where total labor supply (as well as its households
components; see below) grows at the natural rate 𝑛. The split
of this labor supply into a floating, a latent, and a stagnant
segment must now be formulated in detail in order to
complete the model. We thus assume here further that there
are upward (inward) and downward (outward) movements
between the floating and the latent segments of the labor
market. We denote the floating and latent segments as type
1 and type 2 employment, respectively, as indexed above. The
unemployment rate in the floating segment is an indicator of
the percentage of type 1 workers that are compelled to move
into the latent segment and the employment rate of the latent
segment is an indicator of the percentage of people who get
the chance tomove back into the first labormarket.This gives
rise to the following laws of motion (note that law of motion
for ̂𝐿𝑠
2
is more complex, since there are more flows in and
out of this market; the value of 𝑙𝑠
2
can however be determined
residually in the following presentation of the model):
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We have already added here a similar law of motion for
the movement in and out of the stagnant segment of the
labor market which therefore assumes that there are ways
to leave the sphere of pauperism. Yet the downward leading
coefficients 𝛾𝑑
1
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This suggests that, for plausible values of 𝑒
1
, say values greater
than 50%, the parameter 𝛾𝑢
1
must be significantly less than 𝛾𝑑
2
.
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Labor market 2:
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Figure 1: The flow of workers between the segments of the labor
market.
Taken together we have as laws of motion for this
economy with three labor market segments the differential
equations (where everything is expressed per unit of capital
and denoted in lowercase letters):
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where the statically endogenous variable 𝑙𝑠
2
is given by 𝑙𝑠
2
=
𝑙
𝑠
−𝑙
𝑠
1
−𝑑.This represents a description of theMarxian reserve
armymechanismwith the three segments of the labormarket
he assumed as typical for its working under the capitalism of
his time.
We summarize the structure of the considered economy
by way of Figure 1. Figure 1 shows on its left-hand side the
flows occurring between the segments of the labor market
which are therefore not completely separated from each other
but segmented to a degree that is mirrored through the size
𝛾 parameters. The top right figure shows an example of a
Goodwin-type distributive cycle which will be modified to a
convergent dynamics if the real wage barrier term is added to
it, here simply visualized by the −𝜔
1
-expression in the center
of it, the real wage of the workers in the fluid part of the
labor market. The arrows in the middle indicate the forces
that impact the fluid labor market because of the presence of
the other two labor markets, namely, the state of employment
in the latent part of the labor market as measures by the
employment rate 𝑒
1
and the size of the stagnant segment of
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the labor market, 𝑑, here measured relative to the size of
the capital stock. The size of the first variable has a positive
impact on the wage claims made in the fluid labor market
while the size of the second one has a negative effect on the
wage negotiations. The analysis of the model in subsequent
section will show that these feedbacks arising from the lower
labor markets onto the dynamics in the first one will add
destabilizing forces to the distributive cycle generated in the
fluid part of the labormarket, as indicated in the bottom right
figure.
3. Steady State and Stability Analysis
Sincewehave constructed the dynamics around given param-
eter values, the steady state, where time derivatives are zero,
can easily be determined:
𝜔
𝑜
1
=
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1
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2
,
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1
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𝑑
1
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𝑑
1
+ 𝛾
𝑢
1
, 𝑙
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1
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1
𝑒
𝑜
1
,
𝑒
𝑜
2
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𝛾
𝑑
2
𝛾
𝑑
2
+ 𝛾
𝑢
2
, 𝑙
𝑠𝑜
2
=
𝑦/𝑧
2
𝑒
𝑜
2
,
𝑙
𝑠𝑜
= 𝑙
𝑠𝑜
1
+ 𝑙
𝑠𝑜
2
+ 𝑑
𝑜
, (
𝑑
𝑙
) =
𝑑
𝑜
𝑙
𝑠𝑜
,
(7)
where the two latter equations are easily solved for the steady
state values of 𝑙𝑠, 𝑑. For the stability of the 4D dynamical sys-
tem around this steady state first of all it is important that the
determinant of the Jacobian 𝐽𝑜 at the steady state is positive.
This determinant in the case where 𝑑/𝑙 is unimportant in the
wage Phillips curve (𝛽
𝑤𝑑
= 0) is given by
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󵄨
󵄨
󵄨
󵄨
󵄨
󵄨
󵄨
󵄨
󵄨
󵄨
󵄨
󵄨
󵄨
. (8)
Exploiting the linear dependencies between the various
rows of this Jacobian quickly allows the calculation of the
determinant of 𝐽𝑜. The fact that it is positive implies that a
loss of stability can only occur by way of the so-called Hopf-
bifurcation through the death or the birth of an attracting
limit cycle (called sub- or supercritical Hopf-bifurcations,
resp.).
Feedback chains that may create instability in this way are
the two + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + chains shown in the following substructure
of 𝐽𝑜 :
𝐽
𝑜
= (
− + +
+
+
+
) . (9)
In this particular case we face however no difficulty with
respect to the sum of principal minors of order 2, 𝐽
2
, of the
shown Jacobian, since the entries −𝐽
21
𝐽
12
> 0 dominate the
sign of 𝐽
2
since they have the weight 𝑙𝑠𝑜, while the negative
off-diagonal products in the last matrix only have weights
𝑙
𝑠𝑜
1
, 𝑑
𝑜 with respect to otherwise equal products.The principal
minors of order 2 therefore do not create stability problems
through the positive feedback chains they contain. Similar
arguments can be made with respect to the minors of order
3, while the ones of order 2 are obviously zero or positive.
According to the Routh-Hurwitz theorem this indicates that
an increase of the parameter 𝛽
𝑤𝑒
2
need not endanger the
stability of the steady state of the model. This is astonishing,
since the terms 𝐽
14
𝐽
41
, 𝐽
13
𝐽
31
seem to suggest the opposite.
In Figure 2 we start by showing two-phase plots, a
projection into the Goodwin cycle on the first labor market
(Figure 2(a)) and a projection of the interactions between the
fluid and the dead segment of the labor market (Figure 2(b)).
We can see that the Goodwin cycle is now convergent (due
to the error correction term in the wage Phillips curve as
in Blanchard and Katz [26] in particular), but otherwise
of the same kind as the original Goodwin cycle. The dead
and the fluid segments in the labor market appear to be
largely negatively correlated, as one would expect, so that the
dead segment is reduced in extent when the first labor, and
with it the second one, is showing higher utilization rates.
(The simulations serve mainly illustrative purposes of the
theoretical model and do not depend sensitively on specific
choices from the economically meaningful parameter space.)
In Figures 2(c) and 2(d) we show two bifurcation dia-
grams (the bifurcation analyses have been made with the
E&F Chaos software of Diks et al. [27]; the program code
and the exact parametrizations, which are not crucial for the
qualitative implications as long as staying in an economically
meaningful range, can be obtained by the authors upon
request; the program applies the Runge-Kutta algorithm to
run our continuous-time model with a step-size of 1/100)
which suggest that increases in the parameter 𝛽
𝑤𝑒
2
are indeed
stabilizing as we have already suggested above. (Note that
here transient periods of 30 and 100 years, resp., and a plot
of a state variable for 10 years were used. Convergence is
however slow; see the vertical scale on the Figure 2(d), where
300 years of transient behavior have been omitted.) Despite
the existence of positive feedback loops the interaction of
the three labor market segments is therefore not becoming
more problematic if the first labor market becomes more
sensitive to what happens on the second labor market, where
low income work is performed. The same however does not
hold true when the impact of the dead segment of the labor
market on the wage formation process in the first labor
market is increased (by an increasing parameter 𝛽
𝑑
). The
positive feedback loop now sits in the first principal minor
of order 2, top-left in the matrix 𝐽𝑜, and thus in the part
where multiplication with 𝑙𝑠𝑜 takes place when the sum of the
principal minors is formed:
󵄨
󵄨
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𝐽
𝑜
󵄨
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=
󵄨
󵄨
󵄨
󵄨
󵄨
󵄨
󵄨
󵄨
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󵄨
󵄨
󵄨
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+ 0 0 0
+ 0 − 0
+ + − −
󵄨
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󵄨
. (10)
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It therefore dominates the other terms that contain the
parameter 𝛽
𝑑
; see the entries in the matrix shown below,
which implies that choosing this parameter sufficiently large
will make the considered sum negative and thus violate one
of the stability conditions of the Routh-Hurwitz theorem.The
dynamics will therefore become an unstable one by way of a
sub- or supercritical Hopf-bifurcation in general:
𝐽
𝑜
= (
+ −
+
+
) . (11)
Figure 3(a) shows what we have just discussed in analytical
terms. It exemplifies that volatility is increasing by way of
a ten-year time window after transient phase of 30 years.
With respect to the same time window we also consider such
robustness test also for the parameters 𝛼, 𝑧
1
, 𝛾
𝑑
1
. The results
for the parameter 𝑧
2
are nearly identical to the ones for the
parameter 𝑧
1
and show that labor-saving technical change
increases the employment rate in the first labor market.
The same holds true for the parameter 𝛼 which means that
improvements in the income of low wage workers do not
deteriorate the economic position of the economy. However,
increasing the speed with which workers are transmitted
from the first into the second labor market does the same
thing and provides therefore an example where downward
flexibility improves the economy from this partial perspec-
tive.
Instability with respect to an increasing role of the dead
segment of the labor market in the wage bargain in the fluid
labor market is however only one problematic feature of the
existence of a dead weight in the labor market. As is well
known there are many further social consequences of a large
𝐷 in the total labor supply 𝐿𝑠, such as increasing crime, drug
consumption, prostitution, and the like. Moreover, political
instability may arise from such a segment as Chancellor
Bismarck of Germany was one of the first to notice and to
pay attention to (as a political leader of his time and from a
conservative point of view). From a current German point of
view there is however a lack of consciousness among current
political leaders of what the long-run consequences of the
persistent generation of the so-called Hartz IV families with
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very low and insecure wage income and very low payments
to retired people will be.
4. Active Labor Market Policy and an
Employer of Last Resort
We have so far considered an economic system with three
labor markets, a fluid one (the center economy), a latent one
(coming from the periphery), and a stagnant one (where
labor supply lives in the slums, where people primarily live
on charity through the other members of the workforce
whereby part of the latter’s consumption demand is sim-
ply redistributed). (In the extreme such people have been
characterized in Marx “The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis
Napoleon (1852)” as “Lumpenproletariat,” the “refuse of all
classes,” including “swindlers, confidence tricksters, brothel-
keepers, rag-and-bonemerchants, beggars, and other flotsam
of society.” We view the third segment of the labor market—
when increasing—as being on the way to such a social
structure, at Marx’s times and today related to alcoholism,
drug dealing and consuming, youth gang formation, and
racism.) This segment of the labor market is however not
totally a “stagnant” one, since the parameter 𝛾𝑢
2
provides the
extent by which its members can return to the latent segment
of the labor market, depending on the rate of employment in
this market. Workers employed in this second, latent portion
of the labor market receive a given (minimum) real wage,
while the fluid labor market works in the way it is assumed
to work in the context of models of the distributive cycle.
We have abstracted in this extension of the Goodwin model
finally from any social legislation and thus have assumed that
the unemployed in the two active labor markets are living on
the basis of the income of the families they are belonging to, as
it is, for example, often the case in Spain and its larger family
structures.
In the present section we now not only introduce an
unemployment benefit system (augmented by a civic work
below) for the two active labor markets of the model but
we also assume that the system can be made watertight in
the downward direction; that is, the massive generations of
a totally degraded workforce are no longer possible in it. Of
course, there may exist disabled people of various kinds, but
this is not a problem a macromodel has to deal with, so that
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we can simply assume that 𝛾𝑑
2
= 0 is established through
a social network for the unemployed, performing now civic
work for the society, civic work which is supervised by the
public sector but organized on a private level.
We now consider this second labor market more of the
type of a lower income sector, providing the base income
corresponding to a basic consumption basket of an advanced
capitalist economy but representing “atypical employment,”
a seemingly necessity in current capitalism where such
additions to the permanent staff are demanded by firms
(here in the amount 𝑌/𝑧
2
). Moreover, we postulate that the
public sector can demand services (called civic work which
may be organized by modern communication techniques
through social networks) from the unemployed (who are all
receiving unemployment benefits at the base income level
just discussed). The organization of these (social) services of
course demands microeconomic coordination, with appro-
priate incentive as well as sanction schemes and with an
organizational structure based on electronic networking and
the like.
We thus assume now the existence of a public employer
of “last resort” who organizes with the help of (electronic)
self-organization of the members of the civic work segment
the employment (including processes of lifelong learning) of
those workers who are not employed by capitalist firms in the
first and second labor markets. The public sector thus tries
to improve the living conditions in the second labor market
as much as possible and administers the funds (received
from the workers employed in the first labor market) for
the privately unemployed and also conducts a system of
social services (in a broad sense of this word) supplied by
the “unemployed” (including skill preservation, processes of
lifelong learning, and the like).
We are therefore assuming, for the Goodwin model with
segmented labor markets 𝛾𝑑
2
= 0, the existence of sufficient
unemployment funds 𝐵, which are depleted by the current
base wage payments 𝜔
2
to civic work (a historical subsistence
wage which is nevertheless significantly “better” than what
currently happens in the Hartz IV sector of the German
economy) and refunded by taxation of the income of workers
at the rate 𝜏
𝑏
in the first labor market and the adequate
microeconomic organization of civic work which is neutral
in its effects with respect to the work done in the private
sector of the economy.We are also assuming on this basis that
the homogeneity of the universal skills of the total workforce
is preserved in this way. Due to this homogeneity of the
workforce we can therefore now measure all employment
rates in reference to 𝐿𝑠 solely and thus can express the rate of
employment in the civic work sector in residual form by 𝑒
𝑠
=
𝑆/𝐿
𝑠
= 1−𝑒
1
−𝑒
2
. As themodel is formulatedwe have however
no “ALG1” payments (unemployment benefits to workers
in the first labor market for a limited time period > 𝜔
2
),
since this would introduce a time structure in unemployment
benefits which would increase mathematical complexity,
without enriching the consideredmacrostructure verymuch.
Moreover, since there is no delay in the adjustment of the
workforce of firms, an activating labor market policy is not
yet a meaningful topic here.
In order to apply this, we start again from the 4D model
of unrestricted capitalism:
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(12)
With the introduction of civic work the stagnant segment of
the labor market has been eliminated by assumption. This
implies that 𝑑/𝑙𝑠 = 0 has to be replaced by 𝑠/𝑙𝑠, 𝑠 = 𝑆/𝐿𝑠 with
𝑆 the current number of civic workers. Based on this, we get
as laws of motion for real wages and the labor markets of the
economy the following ones (𝛽
𝑤𝑑
replaced by 𝛽
𝑤𝑠
now):
?̂?
1
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(15)
where 𝑙𝑠𝑜 is the steady state solution of (13) and where the
steady state value for the real wage is obtained from (14). The
fact that 𝑒
1
is exogenously given corresponds to the respective
negotiation power of the labor and the capital side. As 𝑒
1
is a
kind ofNAIRU that is not inflationary, it can only be achieved
by a balance of power between the two production factors. By
the choice of the benchmark levels of the employment rates
we have adjusted the steady state of the model in principle
to the one of the model of unrestricted capitalism (as far
as their common features are concerned). Moreover, our
modification of the Marxian model has brought us back to
the basic format of the Goodwin model, with the stabilizing
real wage barrier term in addition now. The model of this
section is therefore obviously globally asymptotically stable
as exemplified in the simulation of the model shown in
Figure 4.
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The elimination of the stagnant segment is achieved
by a policy that erects an unemployment benefit system
embedded into a civic work structure with reserves 𝐵 as
follows:
̇
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Workers employed in the first labor market are now taxed
with rate 𝜏
𝑏
in order to create inflows into the reserves
of an unemployment benefit system. The outflow goes to
unemployed workers of types 1 and 2 who receive the wage
of the employed workers of type 2 as unemployment benefits
and have to provide civic work in return (besides their skill
preservation activities). This policy at least guarantees skill
preservation for workers of types 1 and 2, by employing the
(1 − 𝑒
1
)𝐿
𝑠
1
+ (1 − 𝑒
2
)𝐿
𝑠
2
workers as an “employer of last
resort” in public institutions, which provide social services
and more, yet work that is not in competition with the
activities occurring in the private sector of the economy.
The normal skills of the potentially unemployed people are
therefore kept intact at least as suppliers of work of type
2. A labor market reform along these lines thus eliminates
the existence of a stagnant segment on the labor market.
Nevertheless, we still consider this as very basic reforms of the
labormarket institutions, yet one that is significantly superior
to the Hartz IV system of Germany.
We have for the variable 𝑏 = 𝐵/𝐾, the benefit funds per
unit of capital, the law of motion:
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(18)
This expression shows that the parameters of the model
have to be determined with care such that the wage income
after taxes of households of type 1 is of an appropriate size.
Moreover, the law of motion for 𝑏 is a stable one as long as
the prerequisite of a converging core model (see (13)-(14)) is
met.
The case of Germany in recent decades provides an exam-
ple where things went wrong eventually after a long postwar
prosperity phase due to a lack of cooperating corporatism
between capital and labor primarily in the question of income
distribution. It is shown in Flaschel and Greiner [25] that
adding minimum real wages as well as maximum ones to
the distributive cycle can reduce its amplitude significantly
both in the prosperity phase and the depressed phase. The
reserve army of unemployed thus thereby is reduced in the
depression and the social degradation of part of theworkforce
avoided. But in the prosperity phase, unions in Germany did
not think in terms of Marx’s reserve army mechanism and
did not consider ceilings to their real wage claims. Chancellor
Willy Brandt supported indirectly this behavior when he
proclaimed that full employment would now be maintained
forever. But Marx’s overshooting income claims mechanism
worked in this context (leading first to stagflation and later
on to stagnation without inflation). By contrast, minimum
real wage legislation was not taken seriously after the Iron
Curtain came down, neither by the social democrats who
under Chancellor Schro¨der implemented the Hartz I–IV
reforms nor under Chancellor Merkel where the discussion
about minimum wages was only conducted from a very
microeconomic perspective. The result of such policies was
the establishment of a progressively increasing low-income
or part-time labormarket segment and from there the flow of
workers into Hartz VI which can by and large be considered a
stagnant segment from the perspective of the social standards
of the fluid segment of the labor markets in Germany.
These policies opened watergates on the labor market
into a downward direction and contributed significantly to
a return of a labor market structure as investigated already
by Marx [23] in Capital, Vol. I, and modeled in this paper.
Lacking insights into the Marxian reserve army mechanism
on both sides of the conflict about income distribution
(concerning agreements on both maximum and minimum
real wages) as well as on both sides of the political spectrum
in Germany (concerning resistance to processes of social
degradation within the workforce) have now led in Germany
to a situation where processes of social segmentation are
difficult to overcome (even if policy would be willing to act
accordingly).
The 1960s and early 1970s (where theMarxian insight into
the working of capitalism and the reserve army mechanism
was totally neglected) can thus be considered as a time
of lost chances, since maximum and minimum real wages
are easier to negotiate and implement by law in prosperity
phases. To a certain degree the consequences of this failure
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was the disintegration of the concepts that constituted the
German way to a “social market economy” into the direction
of low-income work and widespread poverty and its social
consequences.
5. Historical Origins and Political Perspectives
5.1. Social Legislation under Bismarck. The unrestricted
working of the distributive cycle is not a viable way an
advanced capitalist economy can reproduce itself in the long
run. We conclude that from what is shown in Figures 3(a)–
3(d) and in the analysis accompanying it. The first person
who became fully aware of this fundamental problem of
capitalism on the side of the ruling classes was definitely Otto
von Bismarck, PrimeMinister in Prussia (appointed in 1862),
and later on Chancellor in the German Empire which was
founded in 1871 with Wilhelm I as first German emperor
(and king of Prussia). When the last German emperor—
Wilhelm II—came into power in 1888, the time of Bismarck
as politically influential German chancellor was soon over,
since Wilhelm II intended to make his own type of in fact
internationally and nationally unbalanced policy. Bismarck
thus resigned from his chancellorship in 1890.
The social legislation initiated by Bismarck was by no
means an act of humanism, but a reflected strategic reaction
to the social movements which the conflict between capital
and labor in the sphere of production and about income
distribution had created. A similar observation may hold for
the Cold War period after World War II, while the opposite
happened after the fall of the Iron Curtain in the 1990s, which
was preceded however by Reaganomics and Thatcherism in
the 1980s in the Anglo-Saxon world as a reaction to the
stagflation of the 1970s. These latter deregulation policies did
not at all pay attention to the social consequences they caused
(compared to the prosperity phase after WWII).
Otto von Bismarck was born as a member of the Prussian
landed aristocracy and after his education soon became part
of the Prussian parliament as a conservative. As chancellor
of the new Empire, Bismarck soon started to deal with social
legislation though his first domestic measures were aimed at
the role of theCatholic church and its influence.These actions
are known as “Kulturkampf” and can be regarded as part of
secularization though this was not the aim. A main success
was the introduction of “civil marriage” but the results of
the “Kulturkampf” were not generally successful with regard
to the influence of political parties. One of Bismarck’s aims
had been to reduce the influence of the Catholic-oriented
parties, such as the German Center Party. Therefore he even
cooperated with the liberal parties in spite of significant areas
of disagreement.
The failed revolution of 1848 as well as the social situation
of the working class had raised the interest in the population
of the German states in social issues, although the 1848
revolution was mainly part of a civil movement with the
aim of a German unification. But after 1848, the first worker
unions were established and socialist parties were founded,
partly related to the ideas of Karl Marx. Thus, an important
working class movement could develop with socialist parties,
unions, and other working class organizations with the
intention to improve the economic and social situation of
the workers. Bismarck succeeded in 1878 to implement an
“antisocialist law” with the help of conservative and national-
liberal parties, but the socialist movement nevertheless grew
stronger so that the law was not renewed in 1890. Bismarck’s
best known and certainly most important decisions were
the implementation of the world’s first social legislations.
Those are supposed to have been established not only due
to the insight into the necessity for the state to improve the
burdensome lot of workers, but also due to the fact of the
increasing influence of the social-democratic party. Bismarck
hoped to reduce this influence by introducing several social
laws.These were mainly insurance bills so that the workers of
the economywere not left unprotected (see Federal Statistical
Office [4] and van Meerhaeghe [28]). Bismarck was aware of
the bad working conditions and willing to improve them but
wanted at the same time to avoid regulations that could harm
the economy.
Three areas of risk were regulated starting with theHealth
Insurance for part of the workers in 1883 which was trans-
ferred intoHealth Insurance Act formost of the workers.This
is the starting point of Medical Care in Germany. The Health
Insurance was financed by contributions of employees (two-
thirds of the sum) and employers (one-third of the sum). In
1884,The Accident Insurance Act followed which was of high
relevance especially for workers in particularly dangerous
establishments. This insurance was paid by employers who
otherwise had to pay for workers who suffered an accident.
The Law of Invalidity and Old Age Insurance for workers,
journeymen, and apprentices was the third social law in 1889
which was the starting point of a general old age pension
insurance. Employers and employees had to pay each half
of the costs which was also subsidized by the state (see
Holborn [29]).Thus, the social security legislation which was
implemented by Bismarck can without doubt be regarded as
a first step towards a welfare state though the situation of
working families remained difficult in the 19th century.
It was criticized as “Staatssozialismus” especially by the
liberals but in 1881 Bismarck even made a prediction:
It is possible that our policy may be reversed
at some future time when I am dead; but State
Socialism will make its way. (Busch 1898)
There are also reasons for the remaining bad situation
of workers to be found in Bismarck’s social laws themselves,
since, for example, not all workers were included in the three
laws and not all possible cases were considered, at least not
at the beginning. Other critical points are related to the fact
that theOldAgeProgramallowed only payment after 30 years
of work and not before the age of 70 though the average age
expectationwas below 50 at that time. As Khoudour-Caste´ras
[30] shows, there was a notable positive effect of the social
legislation with regard to the German emigration (mainly
to the United States) since many Germans now decided to
abandon their migration plans.
5.2. CivicWork as a Key Factor of Future LaborMarket Policy.
Social legislation (based on democratic principles)may be the
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prerequisite to put workers, who were lost and deprived of
their skills in the dead segment under unregulated capitalism,
back to a meaningful occupation with adequate living condi-
tions. We will deal with the question of what such a social
legislation can look like to guarantee (re)integration into
work life and the society and to create a positive perception
for those people employed through an active labor market
policy.
Active labor market policy must be conducted com-
plementarily to the presence of free market hiring and
firing in the fluid segment of the labor market. It is not
meant to crowd out skilled workers of the first segment
but to provide a safety net for those kicked out due to the
business cycle component in macroeconomic development.
Besides the social benefits arising from an appropriate social
legislation, skill preservation is the second major function
of the civic work system to be established. If a worker
becomes unemployed in the competitive first labor market,
she should be immediately supported by a governmental
labor market agency to secure her income by unemployment
benefits. Unemployment benefits could be paid out of a kind
of insurance scheme as it is done today in Germany. When
she is no longer entitled to receive them after a while and has
not found a new job, she might enter the civic work program
offered to everybody by the state. It can be tax-financed by
the workers occupied in the fluid segment who will likely
have a rather high income on average. Of course, this is
only one possible financing scheme, actually the one used in
our formal model. This way of financing is chosen for the
sake of keeping the model simple and to avoid unnecessary
complications. But from societal point of view it might also
be opportune to tax firms’ profits as well.
Payments in the civic work program might no longer
depend on previous income but are equal for everyone,
though they should take into account family backgrounds.
Summarizing, one can briefly outline the principles and
objectives of civic work as follows: civic work has to be
conducted in a tit-for-tat manner, which means that support
by the state is granted in exchange for an obligation to work.
This principle must be applied to the extent the participants
of the program are actually able to work. The term workfare
has been discredited in recent times but might capture the
principle quite well as long as it is understood in a technical
way.
One of the main advantages of a civic work system is that
it stops stigmatizing unemployed people. Under civic work
the formerly unemployed people would contribute their part
to the community. Lifelong learning is a major ingredient
of the civic work proposal to preserve and even enhance
the skills of individual workers. This can be achieved by
employing those skills in a meaningful way to the benefit
of the community and give all participants the opportunity
to adjust their set of skills to the demand of potential
employers in order to raise the probability of matching in the
competitive labor markets.
The matching problem has to be solved not only in the
first labormarket, but in the area of civicwork too.The society
is in need of several services not provided by the market.
Civic workers who are willing and capable of delivering
those services must be assigned to the respective “jobs.” As
it turns out, this is also a matching problem which does not
have to be solved top-down by a governmental authority,
but in an intelligent bottom-up way. Means brought up by
the information society might be of not underestimated help
here.
This brings us naturally to the question of how to
organize civic work. As already mentioned a guiding iron
principle in contrast to former concepts of “workfare” must
be to organize civic work as a bottom-up approach and not
top-down in an authoritarian way. The government could
introduce anduse, for example, e-civic-work online platforms
to support the matching process of skills due to a demand
and supply principle. Governmentmight provide some of the
resources for this allocation device but should allow for self-
organization of the virtualmarketplaces.The platform should
be run on a nonprofit basis (this is something different than
commercial social platforms like Facebook and the like). It
can be programmed andmaintained (as well as improved) by
civic workers with appropriate qualifications.
Also voluntary input is possible: that means it is open
to contributions from everyone and thus remains in the
public domain. There are existing successful examples for
open source (public domain) projects like the LaTex com-
munity, which has provided a high-standard software tool
for academic paper-type setting for years with permanent
improvements.
Possible civic work services include, for instance, the
schooling of adults as part of lifelong learning and skill preser-
vation and enhancement, care for the elderly or children
with respect to additional services which are not provided
under competitive market conditions, community projects
of all kinds (which could not be financed otherwise), which
demand a wide range of contributions from construction
work to service in libraries, engagement in community
politics, support of local sports clubs, and many more.
However, a crucial point which is not to be neglected is
the question of the transition to such a system of civic work.
If a government should decide to implement civic work as we
have put it forth, nomaster planwould be needed. Some rules
at the beginning would provide for an “organic” generation
of a robust and efficient civic work system. The government
would have to give organizational principles when pursuing
the goal of establishing civic work as we understand it.
Guidelines and basic rules are needed, but no planning in
detail from top. Self-organizing and learning by doing are
from an evolutionary point of view superior principles to
design any kind of such an admittedly complex system.
6. Conclusions
In this paper, we started from a baseline version of the
Goodwin [1] model of the distributive cycle which describes
the implications of the reserve army mechanism of capitalist
economies. We have added to this model segmented labor
markets as described in Marx’s Capital, Vol. I. The models
exhibited a unique steady state solution which depends on
the speeds with which workers are pushed into or out of
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the labor market segments. We investigated the stability
properties of this model and found that, though there was a
stabilizing inflation barrier term in our wage Phillips curve,
the interaction between the latent and the stagnant portions
of the labor market generated potentially destabilizing forces.
We then introduced an active labor market policy where
government acts as employer of last resort, thereby elim-
inating the stagnant portion of the labor market, whilst
erecting an unemployment benefit system that sustains the
incomes of workers that leave the floating labor market into
the latent one. We showed that this policy guarantees the
macrostability of the economy’s growth path. However, the
affordability of such a structure needs a certain level of real
wages and thus should be embedded into a model where
there is growth of labor productivity. In such a system, where
full employment is guaranteed, concerns about inflationary
pressures should however be taken into account; see Desai
[31] for its initial treatment in the Goodwin model. We have
therefore proposed a wage Phillips curve where elements of
cautiousness are incorporated in a simple way, suggesting
that more reflection is needed in order to design a wage
management system that avoids strong inflationary pressure
in the boom and that eschews the danger of deflation during
recessions.
In the model of this paper, we have assumed Say’s law
and considered mainly the supply-side dynamics of the
economy. Itwould be interesting, as an area of future research,
to consider demand-side implications of introducing civic
work through an “employer of last resort.” We postulate that
the introduction of the demand-side channel, together with
the appropriate policy refinement, will further add some
stabilizing force that will minimize the amplitude of the busi-
ness cycle. Furthermore, the consideration of the demand-
side will provide a proper framework through which the
effects of various interventions on economic performance,
for example, civic work versus the Basic Income Grant, are
compared.
Finally, we conclude that a reformed type of capitalism
may be working much better compared to the unrestricted
one, normally justified by international competitiveness pres-
sures, where labor market segmentation can give rise to big
economic and social problems. These problems can range
from loss of social cohesion to social conflict and political
instability.
Appendix
Stability of Balanced Growth
In this section we investigate the stability properties of
the Marxian growth cycle model with the segmented labor
markets whichwe have formulated above.We thus reconsider
again the 4D autonomous system given by
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Since linear dependent expressions cancel in the calculation
of the determinant of the Jacobian of this system at the
steady position, we can simplify the right-hand side of
these equations as follows, without changing the sign of the
determinant of this Jacobian:
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After further reductions we arrive at the following form of a
truncated Jacobian of this dynamical system:
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This gives for the determinant of this Jacobian the expression
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since 𝑑 < 𝑙𝑠 holds at the steady state.
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With respect to the other stability conditions we have
to consider the sign distribution within the Jacobian of the
dynamical system:
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which is given by
𝐽
𝑜
= (
− ? ? ?
+ 0 0 0
+ 0 − 0
+ + − −
) . (A.6)
If the first term in the Phillips curve is dominating the second
and the third one with respect to the state variable 𝑙𝑠, 𝑙𝑠
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the type of aGoodwin cycle 𝐽
12
< 0 (with damped oscillations
however) we in particular get (in order to get this result the
conditions 𝛽
𝑤𝑒
1
(𝑧
2
/𝑧
1
)(𝑙
𝑠
2
/𝑙
𝑠
1
)
2
> 𝛽
𝑤𝑒
2
,
𝛽
𝑤𝑒
1
(𝑦/𝑧
1
)(𝑙
𝑠
/𝑙
𝑠
1
)
2
, 𝛽
𝑤𝑒
1
(𝑦/𝑧
1
𝑙
𝑠
)(𝑙
𝑠
/𝑙
𝑠
1
)
2
> 𝛽
𝑤𝑑
must hold;
however, other cases with other stability properties are possi-
ble and thus make the outcome of this model of unrestricted
capitalism somewhat ambiguous)
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In addition to the stability result obtained above we see fur-
ther stabilizing feedback channels at work. In the Goodwin
subdynamics, that is, the interaction of the state variables
𝜔
1
, 𝑙
𝑠, we have again the result of the distributive cycle
without segmented labor markets. There are however also
destabilizing feedback chains at work now. There is first the
cumulative interaction of 𝑑, 𝜔
1
in the laws of motion of real
wages and of the stagnant segment of the labor market. And
secondly, there is the cumulative interaction between the state
variables 𝑙𝑠
1
, 𝜔
1
in the laws of motion for real wages and
the latent segment of the labor market. Of course all these
statements are made from a partial perspective concerning
the principal minors of order 2 of the Jacobian 𝐽 solely. There
are no destabilizing adjustment processes in the trace of 𝐽.
We however conclude from these observations that the stable
Goodwin growth cycle within the floating element of the
labor market is plagued by some positive feedback chains
caused by the existence of the latent and the stagnant part
of the labor market and their interaction with the real wage
dynamics in particular. Should these feedback chains make
the overall dynamics unstable, thiswill occur byway of aHopf
bifurcation, through the death or birth of unstable or stable
limit cycles, respectively, since the determinant of the system
cannot change its sign; that is, the roots of the Jacobian can
only enter the positive part of the complex plane of complex
numbers by becoming complex at the bifurcation point. The
loss of stability therefore necessarily occurs in the presence of
business fluctuations.
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